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SCOTUS

IN THE STRAIT OF MESSINA:

STEERING THE COURSE BETWEEN PRIVATE
RIGHTS AND PUBLIC POWERS
DONALDJ. SMYTHE*
ABSTRACT

The greatest challengefor any civilized society is to find the
appropriate balance of rights and responsibilities between the
individual and society. In the United States, the Supreme Court
is the ultimate arbiter of the line between individual rights and
governmental powers. The prerogatives and protections for
private property rights help to define that line. The Supreme
Court has developed two distinct bodies of constitutional
jurisprudencebearing on the protectionsfor privateproperty, one
under the doctrine of substantive due process and the other under
the Takings Clause. But the appropriate balance has been
difficult to achieve, and the Supreme Court'sjurisprudence has
been prone to slippage. Thus, substantive due process has lost its
teeth. Unless fundamental rights are implicated, modern
substantive due process claims are so unlikely to succeed they are
rarely worth making. Modern takings jurisprudencehas not lost
its teeth, but it has become incoherent and dysfunctional. The
Supreme Court does not apply its takings jurisprudence
consistently across different types of claims, and its expansive
interpretation of public uses has allowed government takings
powers to be exploited by powerful political interests. Takings
jurisprudence could be made more coherent and less
dysfunctional by clarifying the nuisance rule, extending the
public use requirement to all takings, and narrowing the
interpretation of public uses. These refinements of takings law
would empower governments to resolve nuisance conflicts,
improve the coherence of the Court's jurisprudence across
different types of takings, constrain governments from using their
regulatory and takings powers on behalf of special interests, and
reduce the burden of government on privateproperty.

* Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor Professor of Law, California Western School of Law, San

Diego, CA 92101.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The greatest challenge for any civilized society is to find the
appropriate balance of rights and responsibilities between the
individual and society. Because the United States is a
constitutional democracy, the most difficult questions about how
to strike that balance are often answered by the Supreme Court
of the United States. The Supreme Court's answers help to
define the boundary between the individual rights and liberties
of American citizens and the powers of the federal, state, and
local governments. This is no small task, which is why the title of
this Article analogizes it to charting a course through hazardous
waters.' It is inevitable that there will be disagreement and
controversy about the Court's answers; they have important
political implications, and political opinions in any free society
can differ widely. But, at the very least, we should hope for some
coherence in the Supreme Court's decisions that demarcate the
constitutional line between individual rights and liberties and
governmental powers. Sadly, such coherence is lacking in some
of the Court's most important jurisprudence.
The role of the government has significantly expanded in all
developed countries during the last one hundred fifty years. The
second industrial revolution that began around 1870 gave rise to
new modes of transportation, new technologies, a national
economy, and a plethora of modern corporations formed under
general corporation laws. It also raised questions about whether
and how the government should manage or control the
proliferation of new market activities and new business practices
in the emerging modern economy. The questions were often
manifested in legal challenges against government actions that
sought to intervene in the economy and regulate the use of
private property. The legal challenges often asserted limitations
on government powers to regulate economic activities under the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments or
on government powers to take private property under the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court's
modern substantive due process and takings jurisprudence
evolved out of those cases.
1. In Greek mythology, the Strait of Messina between Sicily and Calabria is the home
of two great sea monsters, Scylla and Charybdis. The difficulty of navigating through such
a narrow body of water with Scylla on the Calabrian side and Charybdis on the Sicilian
side posed an unavoidable hazard to passing sailors.
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The doctrine of substantive due process originally rested on
the notion that the liberty of contract under the Due Process
Clause placed certain individual property rights and economic
rights beyond the reach of government regulation. 2 As the
doctrine evolved in the twentieth century, however, it lost its
teeth except in cases where fundamental rights are implicated.3
Today, for the most part, the doctrine of substantive due process
does little, if anything, to limit the scope of government
regulatory powers. Unless fundamental rights are implicated,
modern substantive due process claims are so unlikely to succeed
they are rarely worth making. Substantive due process, therefore,
is almost a dead letter. At this point, there is little hope that it
will play any further role in defining the appropriate balance
between government powers, individual property rights, and
economic liberties.
Modern takings jurisprudence has not lost its teeth, but it is
incoherent and dysfunctional. The incoherence arises because
the Court does not apply the Takings Clause uniformly across all
takings cases. 4 The dysfunctionality arises because the Court has
defined the public use requirement so broadly that the
government's takings powers can be commandeered by powerful
political influences.5 Nonetheless, recent Supreme Court
decisions have made it clear that the Court is willing to restrain
the government's takings powers in conventional and other
takings cases. Because takings law has been applied so broadly, it
now has more potential to restrain government powers than
substantive due process, especially if the Supreme Court is
willing to make its takings jurisprudence more coherent and less
dysfunctional.
This Article suggests how takings jurisprudence could be
made more coherent and less dysfunctional and how it could
thus improve the panoply of social benefits we derive from
private property rights while still clothing government with
essential regulatory authorities. These suggestions can be
summarized in three basic rules: (1) nuisance regulations are
never takings; (2) the public use requirement should apply to all
takings, including regulatory takings and takings through

2.

See infra subpart III(A).

3. See infra subpart 1I (A).
4. See infra subpart III(B).
5.

See infra subpart HI(B).
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exactions; 6 and (3) public uses should be limited to (i) the
transfer of private property to public ownership, (ii) the transfer
of private property to public carriers, utilities, or throughways,
and (iii) the transfer of private property to private owners for
uses that will be open to the public. The adoption of these rules
would empower governments to resolve nuisance conflicts,
improve the coherence of the jurisprudence across different
types of takings, constrain governments from using their
regulatory and takings powers on behalf of special interests, and
reduce the burden of government on private property.
The next Part of this Article discusses the relationship
between government powers and private property and explains
how the government's regulatory and takings powers burden
private property, even when those powers have not been
exercised. The third Part describes and distinguishes the
substantive due process and takings doctrines. It also clarifies
why nuisance regulations cannot cause takings, and it critiques
the incoherent way in which the Supreme Court has applied the
public use requirement to different types of takings claims. The
fourth Part addresses the need to clarify the scope of the public
use requirement and to apply it coherently in all types of takings
cases; the Part argues that applying the public use requirement
to regulatory takings and exactions takings could help to limit
government regulatory excesses in ways the substantive due
process doctrine no longer can. The fifth Part concludes.
II. PRIVATE PROPERTY AND GOVERNMENT POWERS

A. Property Theory
The dominant theoretical conception of property rights draws
on an analogy of a bundle of sticks.7 Under the bundle-of-sticks
analogy, a person's property rights in a thing are defined by all
of the legal rights and obligations the person has in regard to the
thing.8 Specific legal rights and obligations in regard to the thing

6. An exaction is something of value a landowner must provide in return for a
development permit See infra subpart HI(F).
7. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 102-03 (8th ed. 2014) (analogizing

property rights to a "bundle of rights").
8. To be more precise, a well-defined system of property law defines the hierarchy of
persons' rights regarding land or chattels. See id. at 51 n.33 (explaining that lawyers
consider property rights to be relationships among people with respect to things, rather

than relationships between people and things).
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are thought of as sticks, and the collection of them all is thought
of as a bundle of sticks. Because modern American property law
evolved out of common law rules governing rights in land, it is
easiest to focus the discussion on land, even though the
concepts, in theory, can extend to rights in anything.9
Regarding a person's property rights in land, the bundle of
sticks defines the duration and geographical scope of the
person's rights, as well as the uses that may be made, the actions
that can be taken, the rights that may be exercised against
others, and the transactions that can be undertaken to convey
rights.1 0 Further, the bundle of sticks also defines a person's duty
to pay taxes on the land, the affirmative duties associated with
any affirmative private land use servitudes, and any other
affirmative duties under public laws or regulations on the land."
In theory, any of the rights and obligations in the bundle can
also be made contingent, allowing modification or termination
in various circumstances.
For example, someone could own a life estate in the surface
and air space, but not the subsurface, of a one acre parcel of
land subject to a right-of-way easement of one neighbor. 2 The
life estate would define the duration of the rights, 3 the rights
would be limited geographically to the surface and air space, and
the life estate owner would have all of the usual rights and
obligations of an owner except for the right to exclude the one
neighbor from the use of the right-of-way. Given the many ways
in which the duration, geographic scope, rights, and obligations
in a bundle of rights could vary, especially considering all the
possible ways they might be made contingent, property rights
can in theory be almost infinitely complex. In fact, people may
have property rights that we cannot even imagine-most people
do not have any reason to think about many of their property
rights in all their complexity until they have a property dispute
with someone about them.
9. For well-known treatments of estates in land, see generally RICHARD R. POWELL,
POWELL ON REAL PROPERIY: MICHAEL ALLAN wOLF DESK EDITION (Michael Allan Wolf
ed., 2009), LexisNexis; SHELDON F. KURTZ & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CASES AND MATERIALS

ON AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 246-347 (4th ed. 2003).
10. See Jane B. Baron, Rescuing the Bundle-ofRights Metaphor in Property Law, 82 U. CTN.
L. REV. 57, 68 (2013) (noting the multiplicity of substantive rights the bundle-of-rights
metaphor may implicate).
11. See id. (same).
12. See POWELL, supra note 9, § 15.01 (noting special limitations of life estates).
13. Id.
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B. Government Powers and the Limits of PrivateProperty
Government laws and regulations obviously play an important
role in defining an owner's bundle of rights. For example, a
zoning ordinance that limits uses to single-family residences
eliminates all other uses from the bundle. Similarly, a local
ordinance requiring an annual payment of property taxes places
an important obligation in the bundle.1 4 Federal and state laws
and regulations might create other restrictions and obligations.'15
The restrictions and affirmative duties created by public laws are
analogous to the servitudes that are often created through
private land use restrictions.16 The difference, of course, is that
private land use servitudes are created privately and usually with
the owner's explicit or implicit assent; in contrast,' public land
use servitudes are created through the political process, not only
without the owner's assent but often against the owner's wishes.1 7
The mere fact that the government has the power to eliminate
or diminish rights in a portion of the owner's bundle or create
additional obligations for the owner has important implications
for an owner's property rights. Even if the government has not
yet asserted its powers to do so, the fact that it might do so makes
the owner's property rights subject to a contingency." The
government's power to establish new restrictions or add new
obligations on a parcel of land means that the government has
something like a right of entry or power of termination that it
19
-can assert against specific sticks in the owner's bundle of rights.
20
Of course, a right of entry is a contingent future interest. The
government's right of entry is thus analogous to a contingent
future interest against the owner's bundle of rights. The mere
possibility that the government has the power to regulate the
owner's uses or subject the owner to obligations itself impinges
on the owner's property rights.2 1 Generally speaking, therefore,

14. Donald J. Smythe, The Power to Exclude and the Power to Expel, 66 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
367, 370 (2018) (describing regulatory authority to eliminate property rights or add
affirmative duties).
15. See id. (same).
16. Id.
17. See Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 517, 536-37 (2009) (arguing
that governmental decision-making, even when exercising the power of eminent domain,
is often driven by concerns of reelection and future opportunity).

18.
19.
20.
21.

Smythe, supranote 14, at 370-71.
Id.
23 AM. JUR. 2D Descent and Distribution§ 32, Westlaw (Nov. 2020 update).
Smythe, supranote 14, at 371.
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the government's regulatory powers impinge on private property
even if they have not been exercised. The broader the
government's regulatory powers, the greater the burden on
private property.
The government also has the power of eminent domain,
which gives it the power to take an owner's property rights,
subject to a just compensation" requirement. 22 In property
terms, the exercise of the government's takings powers against
an owner implies that the government not only has a right of
entry that it can exercise against individual sticks in the owner's
bundle of rights through laws and regulations, but also has a
right of entry that it can exercise against the entire bundle of
rights (subject to the just compensation requirement).23 The
power of eminent domain thus subjects all of the owner's
property rights to a separate contingency.2 4 The government's
takings powers confer upon the government a right of entry (or
power of termination) that it may exercise against any property
as long as the constitutional
through condemnation,
requirements for its exercise are met.25 The only significant
difference between a governmental taking and a grantor's
exercise of a right of entry is that when a private grantor
exercises a right of entry against her grantee, she typically has no
obligation to provide the grantee with any compensation;2 6 when
the government exercises eminent domain by taking private
property, the private property owner is, of course, entitled to just
compensation. 27
There is some overlap between the government's regulatory
powers and its takings powers. The Supreme Court has
recognized that regulations can go "too far" and amount to
takings, even though not all of the rights in the owner's bundle
are taken. 28 A separate category of takings-"exactions takings"has also been recognized when regulatory authorities demand
22. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
23. See Smythe, supra note 14, at 372 (noting that a conventional taking involves the
termination of the entire bundle of rights and obligations in a piece of property).
24. See id. (describing eminent domain's ability to eliminate all sticks in the bundle
of property rights).

25. Id. at 372-73.
26. See, e.g., id. at 372 (arguing that the government's takings power is similar to a
contingent future interest); Katrina Miriam Wyman, The Measure of Just Compensation, 41
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 239, 249 (2007) (arguing that corrective justice requires the
government to compensate takings).
27. Wyman, supra note 26, at 252-53.

28. See infra subpart III(E).
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too much from a landowner or make demands that are not
closely enough related to the purpose of the regulatory scheme
as a condition for granting the landowner a permit.2 9 By
recognizing that regulations or exactions may go too far and
amount to takings, the Supreme Court has opened up the
possibility that the government's regulatory powers could be
subject to limits under doctrines that constrain government
regulatory and takings powers.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY

There are two ostensibly important constitutional limitations
on the government's powers to limit private property rights. One
limitation arises under the substantive due process doctrine of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the other arises
under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The
substantive due process doctrine defines the scope of the
government's authority to enact laws and make regulations. 30
The Takings Clause acknowledges that the government has the
power to take private property, but limits that power to takings
for a public use and requires that just compensation be provided
to the owner.3 1 As the Supreme Court developed the doctrines

29. See infra subpart III(F).
30. The substantive due process doctrine essentially defines the scope of the
government's inherent powers. The United States Supreme Court applied the doctrine
strictly in the early decades of the twentieth century and thus struck down governmental
regulations in a number of important cases. BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL
COURT 4 (1998). The matter nearly resulted in a constitutional crisis when President
Franklin D. Roosevelt was impeded from implementing his New Deal legislation. The
Court then began to apply the substantive due process doctrine less strictly before
President Roosevelt followed through on his Court-packing plan. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN,
WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 43 (1991) (endorsing the "switch in time" interpretation
of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish). The scope of the government's regulatory powers was
defined more broadly thereafter, and private property rights were circumscribed more
severely. See CUSHMAN, supra, at 3 (mentioning the impacts of the shift in Supreme Court
jurisprudence after 1937). See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
NEW DEAL (2000) (discussing the Court's ideological shift across the 1930s).
31. In a conventional taking, the state's power is used to take possession of land away
from the individual owner. The individual owner could be a natural person or a
corporate person. See generally, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)
(applying the Takings Clause to individuals); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States,

282 U.S. 481 (1931) (applying the Takings Clause to a corporation). Because all of the
sticks in the owner's bundle are taken, the intrusion is much greater than that caused by
a government regulation, unless the regulation amounts to a regulatory taking. See
Coniston Corp. v. Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[I]n cases under
the takings clause the courts distinguish between taking away all of the owner's rights to a
small part of his land and taking away (through regulation) a few of his rights to all of his
land . . . ."). Regulatory takings and takings through exactions do not involve the
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through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, the
constitutional limitations they impose on the exercise of
government powers have become more theoretical than
32

practical.

Until well into the twentieth century, there was some
confusion surrounding the distinction between substantive due
33
process and regulatory takings claims. The confusion was no
doubt a consequence of the cognate roots of the claims in the
Fifth Amendment; it sometimes confounded whether the basis of
a legal challenge was that the government lacked the power to
enact the law or whether the law caused an unconstitutional
taking of private property.34 The incipient and evolving nature of
the Supreme Court's substantive due process and takings
35
jurisprudence probably contributed to the confusion. As the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence developed and clarified the
doctrines in the twentieth century, they came to rest on distinctly
different elements and require different tests.
A. Substantive Due Process
The test for a breach of substantive due process depends on
whether the government's law or action impinges on
fundamental rights. If a government law or action impinges on
fundamental rights, then a "strict scrutiny" test applies, and the
question is whether the law is narrowly tailored to further a
compelling government interest. If a fundamental right is not
impinged, then the courts apply a "rational basis" test, and the
question is whether the law bears a rational relationship to a

government taking possessory rights, and as such, the Takings Clause is not applied to
them in the same way. That is a principal topic of discussion in this Article.
32. This is especially true of substantive due process. The Supreme Court has also
diminished the constraint provided by takings law in cases that have defined public uses
too expansively. At the same time, it has increased the reach of takings law by applying
the Takings Clause to government regulations and exactions. See infra subparts 11(E)-

(F).
33. See Smythe, supra note 14, at 391 (noting how litigants and courts often confound
the two doctrines). Kenneth Salzberg has argued that the Supreme Court continues to
confound substantive due process and takings cases, and now more commonly uses the
Takings Clause to strike laws that should be stricken under the substantive due process
doctrine. See Kenneth Salzberg, "Takings" as Due Process, or Due Process as "Takings"?, 36

VAL. U.L. REv. 413, 414-16 (2002) (exploring the confused state of these doctrines and
the resulting consequences).
34. See Smythe, supra note 14, at 391 (noting this doctrinal confusion).
35. See Salzberg, supra note 33, at 414-16 (discussing the Court's lack of constancy
and its jurisprudential drift regarding takings doctrine).
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legitimate governmental interest. 36 Because laws and regulations
affecting property rarely impinge on fundamental rights, the
rational basis test normally applies to laws and regulations that
affect property. 37 Moreover, because the scope of legitimate
government interests has been construed so broadly in recent
decades, and because the rationality requirement is so loose,
government laws or regulations that impinge on property rarely,
if ever, now breach the substantive due process doctrine. 38
Substantive due process has therefore become almost a dead
letter, and takings jurisprudence is now the primary
constitutional constraint on general government regulatory
powers that do not impinge on fundamental rights or raise equal
protection issues. 39

B. Takings
Takings jurisprudence is much more complicated. In cases
where the government takes permanent physical possession of
an owner's property, there is no question that the government
has taken the property, and so just compensation will be
required if the taking is allowed;" there may, however, be a
question about whether the taking is within the scope of the
government's takings powers.41 The government may only take
permanent physical possession of property for a public use.42
The definition of "public use," however, is controversial.4 3
Scholars have argued that the original intent of the drafters was

36. David N. Mayer, Substantive Due Process Rediscovered: The Rise and Fall of Liberty of

Contract, 60 MERCER L. REv. 563, 626 n.290 (2009).
37. See id. at 572 (noting that the Court's preference for rational basis review offers
minimal protection to private property rights).
38. Smythe, supra note 14, at 401.
39.. There are obviously other constraints on specific governments through the
division and separation of powers. The focus in this Article is on economic regulations
and the regulation of property rather than the equal protection issues. It is relevant to
observe, however, that government takings have sometimes disproportionately burdened
members of suspect categories. See infra Part IV.

40. See Donald J. Smythe, Liberty at the Borders of Private Law, 49 AKRON L. REV. 1, 2627 (2016) (explaining that private property rights are limited by the government's power
to take land in exchange for just compensation).
41. Id. at 27-28. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution contains the express
limitation of the government's power. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

43. See generallyJed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE LJ. 1077 (1993) (tracing the history
of the term); Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Eminent Domain, "PublicUse," and the Conundrum of
OriginalIntent, 36 NAT. RESOURCEsJ. 59 (1996) (analyzing the historical practice of courts
construing the term's meaning).
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44
not to interpret the term narrowly. When the Supreme Court
began to hear takings cases in the nineteenth century, however,
the term was interpreted to confine the government's takings
powers to cases in which land was taken for uses that would leave
45
it open to the public or for uses by public carriers. During the
twentieth century, public pressures for government interventions
to control and manage the economy increased significantly, and
in the last half of the twentieth century, the scope of public uses
was broadened to allow takings to spur economic development,
including some takings in which private property was conveyed
from its initial owners to new private owners for private uses as
part of "integrated [economic] development plan [s]."4
In cases where not all of an owner's rights are taken, but it is
claimed that a government law, regulation, or action has caused
a taking, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence is more
complicated. These are often called regulatory takings cases.
Here, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence rests on an ad hoc,
multi-factored inquiry into the nature of the regulation, the
47
public benefits, and any other relevant factors. It is notable that

there is no inquiry into whether a regulatory taking is for a
public use." There is also-or, at least, there was until
recently4 9-a per se rule that a nuisance regulation is not a

44. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 43, at 1119-24 (arguing that the historical context
of the Compensation Clause suggests that "public use" denotes an entire category of
takings that cannot occur without just compensation, as opposed to takings not for the
public use, which would require only due process); Melton, supra note 43, at 59-80
(presenting an originalist interpretation of "public use").
45. See Melton, supra note 43, at 83 (demonstrating that New York lawmakers in the
1830s understood the term "public use" to mean use for "public possession" and "public
utility"). For a detailed discussion of the historical developments, see id. at 65-83. For a
concise explication of the conventional perspective on the historical development of the
public use requirement, see Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Kelo v. City of New

London, 545 U.S. 469, 494-504 (2005) (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
46. See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 486-87 (majority opinion) (upholding a governmental
transfer of land between private owners as part of an integrated economic development
plan); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34 (1954) ("We cannot say that public ownership is
the sole method of promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment
projects.").

47. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (stating
that the Court engages in "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries").
48. See id. (making no mention of an inquiry into whether a regulatory taking is for
public use).

49. See infra subpart III(D).
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taking.50 This has created its own confusions about when a
regulation is a nuisance regulation.5
Setting nuisance regulations aside for the present, if the ad
hoc, multi-factored test results in a decision that the regulation is
a taking, then just compensation must be provided.5 2 Since a
public use requirement is not applied, there is a presumption
that the taking is within the scope of the government's takings
powers. The substantive due process doctrine in theory provides
a separate test to determine whether the government has the
power to implement the regulation, but unless the regulation
breaches substantive due process, it is presumed to be for a
public use. 53 This may, in part, reflect the fact that takings law
developed to regulate complete takings of property rights in
land long prior to the advent of the modern regulatory state. 54
In more recent years, the Supreme Court has developed a
unique category of takings jurisprudence to address claims that
exactions demanded in return for a permit required under a
regulatory scheme amount to takings.5 5 The Court's theory rests
on the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," which in this
context implies that the government cannot use the permitting
process to "pressure an owner into voluntarily giving up property
for which the Fifth Amendment would otherwise require just
compensation."5 6 The Supreme Court has developed a two-prong
50.

The nuisance rule derives from an early case challenging a land-use ordinance in

Los Angeles. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915) (holding that the
regulation of nuisances falls within the police power of the state).

51. See infra subpart III(D).
52. See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for
Regulatory Takings, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 677, 678 (2005) (arguing that a central issue in
takings analyses should be

deciding how much the government must pay when

compensation is due).
53. Kenneth Salzberg has argued that a regulation that "does not result in the
government actually using [the] property cannot be a taking." Salzberg, supra note 33, at
435. Professor Salzberg's argument and the one here are, in some ways, the mirror
images of one another. His reasoning is that if a taking is for a public use, then a

regulation that is not for a public use cannot be a taking. Id. at 418-19. The reasoning
here is that if a taking must be for a public use, and if a regulation amounts to a taking
and is not for a public use, then the taking must be unconstitutional. Professor Salzberg
argues there should be no regulatory takings; instead, substantive due process should
discipline the use of government regulatory powers. Id. at 434. The argument here
recognizes that the Supreme Court has gutted the substantive due process doctrine but
has also deemed that regulations can go too far and amount to takings; thus, if the
takings are not for a public use, the regulations are unconstitutional.
54. See id. at 431-32 (noting that the Takings Clause was interpreted as being limited
to "real takings" for approximately 175 years after it was written and did not originally
extend to regulations).

55. See infra subpart III(F).
56. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 605 (2013).
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test for determining whether exactions amount to takings, but
the public use requirement is conspicuously absent from its
analysis.57 As with regulatory takings, there is also a presumption
58
that takings through exactions are for a public use. The Court's
exactions takings jurisprudence is, therefore, as disconnected
from its conventional takings jurisprudence as its regulatory
takings jurisprudence, and it is every bit as dysfunctional.
The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that it has been
unable to develop any set formula for determining whether a
regulatory action is a taking, and it has described its regulatory
5
takings jurisprudence as "essentially ad hoc." While from one
perspective that may seem like a refreshingly honest and frank
admission, from another it is a gross understatement. There is
only one Takings Clause, and it does not distinguish between
conventional, permanent physical takings of land and regulatory
takings or takings through exactions. The larger truth is that the
Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence as a whole is ad hoc,
incoherent, and dysfunctional. This Article suggests ways in
which the Court can develop its takings jurisprudence more
coherently and constructively.
C. Public Uses v. Public Purposes
The government's takings powers can be exercised only for a
public use.' 0 Unfortunately, there is no clear guide as to what
constitutes a public use except for the courts' use of the term,
and the courts have not always used the term consistently and
coherently." The Supreme Court's majority opinion in Berman v.
Parke 2 included dicta that suggested public uses should be
interpreted broadly-ostensibly broadly enough to extend to any
57. See infra subpart III(F).
58. See infra subpart III(F).
59. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
60. Smythe, supra note 40, at 27-28. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution
contains the language that has been interpreted to create this limitation on the
government's power. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation."). Scholars have cast significant doubt on
whether the public use requirement was originally intended to provide a serious
constraint on the government's takings powers. For analyses of the original meaning of
the language, see generally Rubenfeld, supra note 43; Melton, supra note 43.
61. For a useful overview of the historical development of the public use
requirement, see Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Kelo v. City of New London,

545 U.S. 469, 494-504 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For more penetrating analyses

of the drafters' original intent, see Rubenfeld, supra note 43, at 1118-24; Melton, supra

note 43, at 59-80.
62. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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public purpose in pursuit of a legitimate government interest.6 3
The Supreme Court, however, most recently addressed a
question about the public use requirement in Kelo v. City of New
London,64 and its opinion shed a different light on the matter.6 5
Ironically, in Kelo the Court stated that it had embraced the
interpretation of "public use" as "public purpose" since the close
of the nineteenth century, but its decision in the case made it
perfectly clear that there is an important constitutional
difference between public purposes and public uses.6
The question in Kelo was whether the New London
Development Corporation (NLDC) could take private properties
(with the payment ofjust compensation) to implement an urban
redevelopment plan in a non-blighted neighborhood 6 7 The
redevelopment plan entailed the transfer of the private
properties to new private owners who would redevelop them for
commercial and residential uses.6 Writing for the majority,
Justice Stevens stated that the question about whether the
takings would be a public use turned on whether the urban
redevelopment plan served a "public purpose." 69 To that end,
Justice Stevens invoked the Court's precedent in Berman, in
which the Court had upheld takings necessary to implement an
urban redevelopment plan in a blighted neighborhood in
Washington, D.C.7 0
In Berman, the Supreme Court equated public uses with
anything that promotes the "public welfare." 7' Moreover, the
Court interpreted the public welfare broadly to include values
that extended to spiritual as well as physical matters and to
aesthetic values as well as monetary ones. 2 Berman, therefore,

63. See id. at 33 ("It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced
as well as carefully patrolled.").

64. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
65. See id. at 487 (noting courts' power to review a governmental taking is to ensure
the taking was not for "private purpose").
66. See id. at 503-04 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing against the Court's holding
on the grounds that it describes a rule against taking for private purpose but fails to

provide a meaningful limit that would enforce the rule).
67. Id. at 474-75 (majority opinion).
68. See id. at 483 (noting the City's coordination of private and public land use).

69. Id. at 480.
70. Id. at 480-81 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-35 (1954)).
71. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (explaining that a taking did not violate Fifth
Amendment requirements because "[t]he concept of the public welfare is broad and
inclusive").

72. Id.
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appeared to interpret the scope of public uses to extend to the
full police powers of the state. Under that interpretation, a
taking for the sake of pursuing any legitimate government
interest would satisfy the public use requirement. This seemed to
imply that the public use requirement was more of a dead letter
3
than the doctrine of substantive due process. Although the
Court's dicta in Berman generated much discussion about the
public use requirement's apparent demise, in light of the
Supreme Court's more recent opinion in Kelo, the reports of its
death were greatly exaggerated.
This is not to say that Kelo lifted the clouds and cleared the
skies. Justice Stevens's majority opinion is hardly a paragon of
judicial reasoning. In fact, no doubt because of the dicta in
Berman, Justice Stevens used the terms public use and public
4
He concluded that the NLDC's
purpose interchangeably.
"unquestionably serve [d] a public
plan
development
economic
public use requirement. 5 But
the
purpose" and thus satisfied
Justice Stevens also made it perfectly clear the Court was not
holding that the government could transfer a property from one
private owner to another outside the scope of a carefully
considered, integrated economic development plan-even
though such a transfer could easily serve some public purpose in
the broader sense of the word." Ultimately, therefore, Justice
Stevens's opinion distinguishes public uses from public purposes
even though he at times uses the terms interchangeably. As
Justice O'Connor observed in a dissenting opinion (joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas), Justice
Stevens confounded the question about the scope of public uses
under the Takings Clause with the question about the
government's inherent powers under its police powers." In
hindsight, Berman's true legacy may be confusion.

73. Substantive due process would at least remain relevant when governments' laws
or regulations implicated fundamental rights. See supra subpart III(A).
74. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480 (arguing that the Court had "embraced the broader and
more natural interpretation of public use as 'public purpose"').

75. Id. at 484.
76. See id. at 486-87 (arguing that the question of a one-to-one private transfer of
property, outside the confines of an integrated economic development plan, was not
presented in the case).
77. See id. at 501-02 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The case before us now
demonstrates why, when deciding if a taking's purpose is constitutional, the police power
and 'public use' cannot always be equated."). In fact, Justice Stevens subsequently
acknowledged that his opinion confounded principles of substantive due process with
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The consequence is that Kelo has made it clear there is an
important and meaningful public use requirement for a taking.
The government only has the power to take private property if it
is for a public use, and the scope of public uses is significantly
narrower than the scope of legitimate government interests. 78 As
the discussion below will elaborate, however, the public use
requirement is not always applied," which contributes to the
incoherence of the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence.
Moreover, the public use requirement is still interpreted too
broadly, which contributes to the dysfunctionality of the
Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence.
D. Nuisance Regulations
Until recently, the conventional wisdom was that one of the
per se rules under the United States Supreme Court's takings
jurisprudence was that a nuisance regulation is not a taking. This
changed with Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council.80 Justice Scalia's opinion cast doubt on
the courts' competence to distinguish when a regulation is a
nuisance one; in fact, it seemed to challenge whether a nuisance
regulation is always conceptually distinguishable from other
regulations.81 It also stated a new per se rule that appeared to
overturn the conventional wisdom about nuisance regulations.8 2
It thus added another layer to the fog that pervades the Supreme
Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence.
The Court's struggle with the nuisance concept in Lucas is
understandable because there have often been disagreements
about when a regulation is a nuisance regulation. In Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon,8" two of the twentieth century's great legal
minds, Justices Holmes and Brandeis, famously disagreed about
whether the law in question constituted a nuisance regulation.
those of the public use requirement. ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF
NEWLONDONAND THE LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN 8 (2015).
78. See Smythe, supra note 14, at 401-02 (arguing that Supreme Court precedents
that expand the scope of public use to include any legitimate governmental interest
extended beyond the historical understanding of the Takings Clause).

79. See infra subparts uI(D)-(E).
80. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
81. See id. at 1023-24 (arguing that nuisance analysis is the "progenitor" of land-use
regulation).

82. See id. at 1027 (holding that where regulation deprives land of all economically
beneficial use, compensation may be resisted only if the "proscribed use interests" were
not part of the title).

83. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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For the majority, Justice Holmes wrote that a Pennsylvania law,
which forbade subsurface mining that might cause a subsidence
of structures on the surface used for human habitation, was not a
nuisance regulation. 84 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brandeis
wrote that the law was a public nuisance regulation. 85 Neither
Justice Holmes nor Justice Brandeis provided much explanation
for their characterizations of the law. The case illustrates how
slippery nuisances can be and how even great minds who
normally think much alike may disagree about them.
The confusion about nuisances and takings is a consequence
of the disconnection between property theory and takings
jurisprudence. Under the common law, a nuisance is an
unreasonable interference with other owners' use and
enjoyment of their properties or with other people's rights. 86
Courts have traditionally distinguished between private
nuisances and public nuisances. A private nuisance is one that
affects only a single other owner or a small number of other
owners; 87 a public nuisance is one that affects the rights of a
larger number of people, often regardless of whether they own
property.8 8 Traditionally, courts have allowed private actions by
individual property owners against other property owners for
private nuisances; 89 they have not, however, allowed private
actions for public nuisances. 90 Public nuisances have
84. Id. at 412-13.
85. Id. at 418-19 (Brandeis,J., dissenting).
86. See, e.g., 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 1, Westlaw (Feb. 2021 update) ("The law of
nuisance recognizes two conflicting rights: property owners have a right to control their
land and use it to benefit their best interests, and the public and neighboring landowners
have a right to prevent unreasonable use that substantially impairs the peaceful use and
enjoyment of other land.").
87. See, e.g., id. § 33 ("A private nuisance springs from the general principle that it is
the duty of every person to make a reasonable use of his or her property so as to occasion
no unnecessary damage or annoyance to his or her neighbor. The concept of private
nuisance involves an interference with or invasion of an individual's interest in the use
and enjoyment of land or property, which interference or invasion must, according to
some courts, be unreasonable and substantial.").
88. See, e.g., id. § 26 ("A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right
common to the general public or all members of the community, such as by directly

encroaching on public property or by causing common injury. A 'public nuisance' has
also been defined as a condition or activity that substantially or unduly interferes with the
use of a public place or with the activities of an entire community.").
89. See, e.g., id. § 214 ("A private nuisance is redressed by a private action because a
private nuisance claim is inherently a private right of action.").

90. See, e.g., id.

§ 206

("Generally, a public nuisance gives no right of action to an

individual either for equitable relief or generally."). Some nuisances, however, are said to
be "mixed" because they are both private nuisances and public nuisances. Id. § 25. In
such cases, of course, private actions would be allowed. The public aspect of the nuisance,

however, would still best be addressed through public action, such as a statute.
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traditionally, therefore, been redressed through statutes and
regulations. 91 Common examples of public nuisances include
emissions from factories, loud noise from bars and nightclubs,
and agricultural water runoff from farms. These are typically
regulated either by federal and state laws and regulations or by
local government ordinances.
When a private nuisance action is brought in court, the court
is asked to decide whether the defendant's actions or behavior
amount to an unreasonable interference with the plaintiff's use
and enjoyment of her property. The court's decision does not
entail any taking of private property rights by the government;
instead, it clarifies how private property rights are assigned
between the two parties.92 If a court holds that the defendant's
use of his property did cause a nuisance to the plaintiff, the
court's decision assigns the right to be free from the nuisance to
the plaintiff's property.93 The defendant's property rights in his
land thus do not include the right to use it in a way that causes
the nuisance. Alternatively, if a court declines to hold that the
defendant's use of his property caused a nuisance, the court's
decision assigns to the defendant the right to use his property in
a way that causes the claimed nuisance, and the court declines to
assign to the plaintiff's property the right to be free from the
claimed nuisance. 94
Under the law of private nuisance, therefore, a property
owner's bundle of rights includes the right to use and enjoy her
land up to the point where the uses cause an actionable nuisance
to her neighbor. Her neighbor's rights to use and enjoy his land
include the right to be free from her nuisances beyond the point
where they would become actionable. In theory, a court does not
realign property rights when it decides a nuisance case; it merely
clarifies where the line between the plaintiff's property rights
and the defendant's property rights lies. And a court, therefore,
neither takes nor conveys private property rights when it makes

91. See id. § 39 ("The legislature has broad discretion to designate a particular activity
to be a public nuisance.").
92. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 79-80 (8th ed. 2011)
(discussing examples of nuisance decisions altering the rights of two opposing private
landowners).
93. See id. at 80 (describing how courts may resolve cases by ordering a defendant to
cease the nuisance).

94. See id. (describing how courts may resolve cases if the defendant's conduct has
not been found to be a nuisance).
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that decision. Thus, in theory, a court's holding that a private
nuisance has occurred can never amount to a taking.
A statute, regulation, or ordinance that controls a public
nuisance serves essentially the same purpose as the case law
controlling private nuisances except that it defines the boundary
between an owner's property rights and the rights of others to be
free from the nuisance. Courts have traditionally declined to
hear public nuisance claims because a private individual does
not generally have standing to assert a cause of action on behalf
of the public, not because there are any other differences in the
purposes of public nuisance law.95 A regulation that controls
public nuisances, therefore, does not take private property rights
away from any property owner; instead, it defines the boundary
between the rights of the private property owner and the rights
of the public. In other words, a public nuisance law cannot
amount to a taking.
Given the purposes and effects of nuisance law, some of the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Lucas seems tortured. Before the
case reached the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina held that the Beachfront Management Act, which
prevented Mr. Lucas from developing his coastal properties, was
intended to prevent harmful and noxious uses and was therefore
a nuisance regulation. 96 Justice Scalia's majority opinion rejected
this holding.9 7 Instead of construing the South Carolina court's
opinion as a mistaken application of traditional nuisance
concepts, the Supreme Court reframed the matter using
concepts from substantive due process doctrine, 98 which would
clearly be inadequate to address a nuisance question. Justice
Scalia then undertook an inapposite analysis of the equivalence
of harm-preventing and benefit-conferring regulations. 99 Of
course, public nuisance law strikes a balance between the rights
of property owners to use their properties in particular ways and
95. See 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances

§ 206,

westlaw (Feb. 2021 update) ("[A] public

nuisance normally must be abated by a proceeding instituted in the name of the state or
at the suit of some proper officer or body ... .").

96. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022-23 (1992); Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 900-02 (S.C. 1991).
97. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022-23.
98. See id. ("The 'harmful or noxious uses' principle was the Court's early attempt to
describe in theoretical terms why government may, consistent with the Takings Clause,
affect property values by regulation without incurring an obligation to compensate-a

reality we nowadays acknowledge explicitly with respect to the full scope of the State's
police power.").
99. Id. at 1023-24.
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the rights of others to be free from such uses by the owners.
Therefore, the distinguishing characteristic of a nuisance
regulation is that it balances the harm of property owners'
nuisance-causing behavior against the benefits to others of being
free from nuisances. In other words, nuisance laws always both
prevent harm and confer benefits. To characterize a nuisance
regulation as only preventing harm is to confound the basic
principles of nuisance law.
Instead of subjecting the South Carolina statute to a nuisance
analysis, Justice Scalia suggested that the appropriate test is
whether the Act's proscribed land uses would already have been
proscribed under South Carolina law when it was enacted.100 The
logic is clear: a statute that merely codifies an existing regulation
cannot cause a taking because it cannot take property rights that
have already been taken and do not exist. But to confine the
scope of nuisance regulations that are exempt from takings
claims to laws that merely codify existing proscriptions is to cast
nuisance law in stone and to interfere with the power of state
governments and state courts to develop their nuisance laws in
accordance with their constitutionally assigned powers. Justice
Scalia, therefore, conceded the nuisance concept in favor of
principles of substantive due process much too quickly.
Justice Sutherland famously observed that a nuisance is "a pig
in the parlor instead of the barnyard." 101 As he explained,
whether a land use law is a nuisance law is not something that
can be ascertained in the abstract; rather, it requires serious
consideration of the circumstances and context.102 Moreover, the
circumstances and context in which land uses occur can and do
change over time, and a land use that was once the right thing in
the right place can become the wrong thing in the wrong
place. 103 State legislatures thus need the freedom to enact new

statutes

that

identify

new

nuisances

arising

under

new

100. See id. at 1029-30 ("The use of these properties for what are now expressly
prohibited purposes was always unlawful, and . .. it was open to the State at any point to
make the implication of those background principles of nuisance and property law

explicit.").
101. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
102. See id. at 387 ("A regulatory zoning ordinance, which would be clearly valid as
applied to the great cities, might be clearly invalid as applied to rural communities.").

103. Id.
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circumstances and in a new context. 1 4 By limiting the scope of
nuisance regulations that are exempt from takings claims to
nuisance
regulations that merely codify existing legal
proscriptions, courts would impinge on state legislatures'
legitimate powers. In theory, this could make nuisance laws static
and ill-fitted to social circumstances.
Lucas created further mischief by stating a per se rule that it is
always a taking when a regulation denies an owner all
economically viable uses of her property.10' This seems to suggest
that even a nuisance regulation could be a taking if it denied the
owner all economically viable uses. It is difficult to conceive of a
nuisance regulation that could do that, but given that a nuisance
regulation merely assigns private rights between private
individuals, it would be illogical to characterize a nuisance
regulation as a taking. Beyond that, the new per se rule creates
its own confusion.
As Justice Stevens asked in a dissenting opinion, when, exactly,
does a regulation deprive an owner of all economically viable
uses of her property?106 The Court held that the South Carolina
Beachfront Management Act deprived Mr. Lucas of all
economically viable uses of his land.1 07 To be sure, Mr. Lucas was
prohibited by the Act from developing his properties for
lucrative residential sales, but it is debatable whether the Act
deprived him of all economically viable uses.1 08 More
importantly, given the significance of the economic impact of
the Act on the value of Mr. Lucas's properties, the Court could
have held that the Act caused a taking without laying down the
new per se rule.
On remand, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
determined that no existing South Carolina laws or caselaw
precedents would have prohibited Mr. Lucas from building

104. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (noting that American jurisprudence has historically
recognized police powers to include the ability to impose new limits on the use of private
property as needs arise).

105. See id. (explaining that the Court's takings jurisprudence requires compensation
for a regulation that deprives land of all economically viable uses in all situations unless

the proscribed use interests were not part of the landowner's title anyway).
106. See id. at 1064-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's rule for
regulatory takings is "arbitrary" as there is not a meaningful difference between losing

ninety-five percent of a property's economic value and losing all its economic value).
107. Id. at 1020 & n.9, 1027 (majority opinion).
108. See id. at 1065 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that Mr. Lucas could
have used his land for recreational activity or sold it to neighbors).
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houses on his lots as he had planned.1 09 That is not surprising. In
fact, if a nuisance law simply prohibits an owner from using her
property in a way that impinges on the rights of others, it is
difficult to conceive how the Beachfront Management Act could
have been construed as a nuisance regulation. The outcome,
however, did nothing to clarify the nuisance rule. The Supreme
Court of South Carolina had precipitated the entire controversy
by holding that when a law prevents serious public harm, no
takings compensation is required.1 10 The Supreme Court of the
United States would have done better, however, to clarify the
nuisance rule and remand the matter back to the South Carolina
Supreme Court for an appropriate application of nuisance law.
Unfortunately, Lucas has left confusion and incoherence in its
wake. Thankfully, there is little evidence that it has played much
role in takings litigation."'
E. Regulatory Takings
What is most conspicuously missing from the Supreme Court's
analysis in Lucas, and what is always missing from regulatory
takings cases, is any consideration of whether the taking is for a
public use.1 2 As it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court,
the United States Constitution states that a taking may occur
only for a public use; if the purpose of a taking is not to serve a
public use, then the taking is prohibited no matter how much
compensation is provided to the owner.11 3 The Constitution does
not distinguish between conventional takings and regulatory or
exactions takings, so there is no constitutional basis for ignoring
109. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992).
110. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020-22.
111. See James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58
WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 60, 61-62 (2016) ("The nuisance exception spelled out in Lucas
does not figure prominently in the post-1992 cases.").
112. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that its regulatory takings jurisprudence
has long ignored the public use requirement. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v.

Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326 (2002) ("After Mahon, neither a physical
appropriation nor a public use has ever been a necessary component of a 'regulatory

taking.'" (emphasis added)). For one scholar who has argued for the application of a
public use requirement in copyright cases, see Kenneth J. Sanney, Balancing the Friction:
How a Constitutional Challenge to Copyright Law Could Realign the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 15 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REv. 323 (2014). For another scholar who has
argued for the application of the public use requirement to regulatory takings from an

originalist perspective, see John Greil, Note, Second-Best Originalism and Regulatory Takings,
41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 373 (2018). For the most part, however, the Court's failure to
apply the public use requirement has been acknowledged without challenge.
113. Kelo reaffirmed this principle. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477
(2005) (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)).
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the public use requirement.1 1 4 If the public use requirement was
simply equivalent to a public purpose requirement and the
government could engage in a taking to advance any legitimate
government interest, then the matter would normally be of little
interest because the public use requirement would have almost
no impact.1 1 5 But if a public use is different from a public
purpose and is not simply defined by the scope of the
government's police powers, the public use requirement
becomes more important.1 1 6 In this respect, Kelo not only
reinvigorated the public use doctrine in conventional, physical
takings cases, but it also created the potential for the public use
doctrine to matter in other takings cases.
There is no rational justification for the Supreme Court to
ignore the public use requirement in regulatory takings cases.
Because the Court does ignore it, the only constitutional limit on
the government's power to take private property through
regulations arises from the doctrine of substantive due process,
which limits the government's takings power less than the public
use requirement in conventional takings. As a practical matter,
therefore, the Supreme Court now provides less protection for
private property against regulatory takings than against
conventional takings. This undermines the coherence of takings
jurisprudence and has the potential to create some absurd
incentives.

For example, suppose the government wished to take a parcel
of land from one private owner to transfer it to another private
owner to encourage investment in the local economy-e.g., an
investment in an auto parts plant-and foster economic
development. According to the Supreme Court's opinion in Kelo,
114. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (making no mention of different categories of
"takings"). Of course, the drafters probably did not anticipate that the Fifth Amendment
would be applied to regulations and exactions. See, e.g., Melton, supra note 43, at 75-76,
80 (explaining that at the time of the framing, Americans were concerned about the
government's power to confiscate property); cf Rubenfeld, supra note 43, at 1085-86
(noting that the U.S. Supreme Court first examined the potential of regulatory takings in
1887 and did not hold that a regulation constituted an uncompensated taking until

1922).
115. The public use requirement would be as toothless as substantive due process
when no fundamental rights are implicated. See Smythe, supra note 14, at 401 (noting
that due to the broadly defined scope of legitimate state interests, the substantive due
process doctrine "places few limits on government powers" when applied to nonfundamental rights).
116. In theory, regulations that are allowed under the rational basis test for a breach
of substantive due process might be deemed unconstitutional because they amount to
takings and the public use requirement is not met.
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such a taking would be unconstitutional, even with just
compensation, because the transfer would not be part of an
integrated economic development plan." 7 It would seem,
however, that the government could enact a land use ordinance
that limited the use of the land to the purpose for which the new
investor would put it-the auto parts plant-and thus, virtually
compel the owner to sell or lease the land to that investor (or
some similar investor). Of course, if the courts deemed the
regulation to amount to a taking, as one would hope, just
compensation would have to be provided. But if there was no
public use requirement, the taking would be constitutional,
compelling the owner to sell or lease the land. A regulatory
taking would thus accomplish something the government could
not do through a conventional, physical taking.
The example may sound contrived, but it is wise to remember
how the Lucas case turned out. In the end, the trial court
ordered the government of South Carolina to pay Mr. Lucas just
compensation. 118 The parties negotiated a settlement under
which the state purchased the land from Mr. Lucas for a price
less than the price he had initially paid for it himself (the state
also agreed, however, to pay his legal costs)." 9 The state
ultimately sold the land to a private developer,12 0 and beachfront
residences now line the shore of the Isle of Palms, South
Carolina. For practical purposes, what happened in Lucas was a
transfer of property from one private owner to another outside
the context of an integrated economic development plan. In
Kelo, the Supreme Court stated that such a transfer would not
satisfy the public use requirement and would not be allowed,
even with just compensation.1 21 If the courts had applied the
public use requirement and invalidated the application of the
South Carolina statute to Mr. Lucas's properties, he probably
would have been the one to earn a profit from developing them
rather than some other developer.

117. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477, 486-87 (acknowledging that using eminent domain to
transfer property between two private owners to maximize productive land use raises
constitutional "suspicion").

118. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992).
119. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 7, at 1179, 1197 (noting that the state paid
Mr. Lucas $850,000 for the two lots that he had originally purchased for $975,000).
120. See id. at 1197 (explaining that the state resold the lots purchased from Mr.
Lucas to a private construction company).

121. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477 (discussing the public use requirement without defining
it precisely).
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As a more general matter, it does not make sense to constrain
governments from abusing their powers of eminent domain
through conventional takings but to give them unbridled powers
to engage in regulatory takings. The Supreme Court has clarified
that there is a meaningful difference between the public use
in
purposes
government
legitimate
and
requirement
clarify
should
Court
the
sure,
be
To
conventional takings cases.
1 22
but its
and limit the scope of permissible public uses further,
revitalization of the public use requirement has the potential to
limit political abuses of governments' takings powers. Applying
the public use requirement to regulatory takings and exactions
takings would lessen the likelihood that governments misuse the
expansive police powers they have been given under the modern
substantive due process doctrine. It would also lend more
coherence to the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence.
F. Takings by Exactions
The proliferation of government regulations in the modern
era has given government significant leverage over property
owners who wish to use their properties in ways that are subject
It has also arguably given governments
to regulations.12
incentives to subject private properties to their regulations, in
24
Land use
part, to increase their leverage over property owners.
owners
property
regulations and local ordinances often require
to obtain permits to develop or use their properties in particular
ways.125 In return for granting the permits, the government
departments or agencies that administer the regulations often
require exactions, which are something of value the landowner
12 6
These exactions
must provide in return for the permit.
typically consist of the transfer of particular property rights or

122. See infra Part IV.
123. See, e.g., wILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS 341-51 (1995) (describing
how the "dramatic expansion of land use regulations" has enabled governments to force
private builders to pay for community benefits).
124. See id. at 342 (observing that local governments would have "no leverage"
without exactions).

125. See, e.g., 83 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning§ 813, westlaw (Feb. 2021 update)

(explaining that a "special permit" is issued to describe an enumerated use allowed by an
ordinance and can allow the affected property to be "an exception to underlying zoning
regulations").
126. See FISCHEL, supra note 123, at 341 (noting that developers must typically pay
fees or provide goods before they are granted a permit).
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money.127 Landowners from whom such exactions have been
demanded have challenged the demands as takings, and the
United States Supreme Court has developed a body of takings
jurisprudence to address such claims.
The Supreme Court has not applied the public use
requirement in exactions cases, either. However, the Court has
developed a two-pronged inquiry. 128 The first prong applies a
nexus test. This asks whether the exaction is rationally related to
the purpose of the regulation under which the permit is
required.1 2 The second prong is a rough-proportionality test.
This asks whether the exaction is roughly proportional to the
adverse impact that granting the permit and allowing the land
use will have on the purpose of the regulation.s0 If the exaction
fails either of the tests, it is deemed to be a taking, and just
compensation is required.
What is missing from the exactions jurisprudence, of course, is
a public use requirement. This means that takings law provides
less protection for private property rights when they are subject
to exactions than when they are subject to conventional takings.
Some exactions that bear no relationship to the purpose for
which a permit is required may still be demanded-subject to
the government's provision of just compensation-even though
they do not meet any public use requirement. The regulation
under which the permit is required thus grants the government.
considerable discretion about how it may use its leverage in the
permitting process to pursue objectives unrelated to the
regulatory scheme under which the permit is required and
unconstrained by a public use requirement. That may encourage
governments to establish permit requirements to pursue
objectives that are unrelated to the permits and could not be
pursued through a conventional taking, where a public use
requirement would apply.
To make matters worse, an exaction that fails the roughproportionality test may also still be demanded-subject to the
government's provision of just compensation-without meeting
any public use requirement. This confers upon the government
127. See, e.g., id. at 341, 344 (discussing examples of exactions consisting of money,
such as paying a fee, and exactions consisting of a transfer of property rigilts, such as
giving an easement).
128. DUKEMINIER ETAL., supra note 7, at 1248-49.

129. Id. at 1248.
130. Id. at 1249.
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the power to take more property rights than is necessary to offset
the adverse effects to the public of granting the permit even
though the taking does not meet a public use requirement.
Although just compensation will be required, it may seem less
than just to the property owner. Of course, it is possible that
exactions might fail both the nexus and rough-proportionality
tests and also not satisfy a public use requirement. In that case, a
government actor could demand exactions in return for
granting a permit under a regulatory scheme when the exactions
bear no relationship to the purpose of the scheme, exceed any
adverse impact of granting the permit, and do not satisfy a public
use requirement.
Adding a public use test to the Supreme Court's exactions
takings analysis thus would not only bring greater coherence to
its taking jurisprudence, but it would also mitigate, if not
eliminate, the perverse incentives for governments to
overregulate and abuse their takings powers. Because an
exaction could only amount to a taking if it passed both the
tests, the public use
nexus and rough-proportionality
failed at least one
exaction
the
if
apply
only
would
requirement
for courts
appropriate
most
be
of those tests. It would, therefore,
to apply the nexus and rough-proportionality tests first and then
to apply a public use test if the government's demand for the
exaction were deemed to be tantamount to a taking. If the
exaction were deemed not to be for a public use, then the taking
would not be constitutional even with just compensation, and
the exaction would have to be voided.
The question then would be whether the government would
be obliged to grant the permit. To discourage governments from
abusing the permitting process, the answer, arguably, should be
"yes." The permit would then be issued unconditionally. If the
government could withhold the permit, some landowners who
had particularly strong interests in developing their properties
might be loath to challenge the exactions for fear their permits
would not be granted. If the government were compelled to
issue the permit unconditionally, on the other hand, there would
be a disincentive for the government to abuse the regulatory
process by demanding exactions that violated both at least one
prong of the two-pronged nexus and rough-proportionality test
and the public use requirement. Of course, governments could
avoid such problems by ensuring their exactions complied with
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the two-pronged nexus and rough-proportionality test. The
public use requirement, however, would still mitigate some
abuses of the regulatory process.
In some cases, an exaction that failed the nexus or roughproportionality tests-or both-might pass the public use test. In
such a case, the taking would be allowed, but just compensation
would be required. For example, in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission,'3' the Coastal Commission's demand for an
easement across the Nollans' property to grant the public access
to the beach would probably pass the public use test, even if it
were applied in the narrow way advocated here.13 2 In such a case,
therefore, the public use requirement would make no difference
to the outcome. In other cases, however, an exaction might fail
the nexus or rough-proportionality test and also fail the public
use test.
In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District,3 3 for
example, the St. Johns River Water Management District wanted
Mr. Koontz to pay for improvements on wetlands several miles
away from his property in return for the permit he needed to
develop his own property.4 When Mr. Koontz challenged the
district, the trial court determined that the money exaction
failed both the nexus and rough-proportionality tests.135 The
district appealed, arguing in part that money exactions should
not be subjected to those tests.1 36 The Supreme Court of the
United States ultimately held that a money exaction should be
subjected to both the nexus and rough-proportionality tests, 37
that the exaction amounted to a taking, and that the trial court's
award of just compensation should stand.m It is very likely,
however, that a money exaction like the one in Koontz would fail
a public use test, especially if it were applied in the narrow way
advocated here. 39 Under the approach advocated here,
therefore, the money exaction would be voided, and the permit
would be granted.
131. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
132. See infra Part IV. An easement like the one demanded in Nollan would be open
for use by members of the public. It would be analogous to a turnpike or public carrier.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

570 U.S. 595 (2013).
Id. at 601-02.
Id. at 603.
Id. at 611-12.
Id.
Id. at 619.
See infra Part IV.
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If a meaningful public use requirement were applied in
exactions takings cases, government regulators might be wary of
demanding exactions that risked failing either the nexus or
rough-proportionality tests, and government regulatory excesses
might be curbed.
IV. CLARIFYING PUBLIC USES AND REVITALIZING PRIVATE
PROPERTY

If the public use requirement were applied to all takings,
whether they were conventional, regulatory, or by exactions,
much more would turn on the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the public use requirement. As it stands, the Court currently
defines a public use for a conventional taking on an ad hoc
basis.14 Thus, takings of land for uses by the government, or for
uses that would make the land open to the public, are public
uses."' Takings of land for transfer to other private owners as
part of an integrated economic development plan are public
uses.142 Other takings might or might not be for public uses. If
there is any guidance in the Court's recent cases, they suggest
that takings are more likely to be considered public uses if they
4 3
would provide benefits more broadly to the public.
Unfortunately, that guidance, if it is such, is too nebulous to
provide much help. The Supreme Court needs to articulate a
more precise interpretation of the public use requirement if it
wants to forestall government abuses of takings powers and
alleviate the uncertainties that government powers place on
private property.
Perhaps even more importantly, the Supreme Court needs to
narrow the scope of the uses that meet the public use
requirement. Although Kelo provided an important reminder
that the public use requirement is still very real, the majority in
Kelo defined public uses too expansively. In fact, the Supreme
Court had already opened the Pandora's Box in Berman, which
conflated the public use requirement with the government's

140. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
141. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005) (O'Connor,

J.,

dissenting) (arguing that the Fifth Amendment forbids takings that transfer private
property to another private owner and criticizing the majority's reasoning as "wash[ing]
out any distinction between private and public use of property").
142. See id. (noting that the Court's definition of "public use" turns on the presence
of an integrated economic development plan).
143. Smythe, supranote 14, at 412.
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police powers. Kelo and Berman upheld challenges against takings
under urban redevelopment plans'4 and thus facilitated takings
under urban redevelopment plans over the last several decades
all across the country.14 The impact of urban redevelopment has
no doubt varied across communities, but in many cases, it
appears that the poor (or middle class) and powerless (or
politically uninfluential) have been the victims of governmentsponsored urban gentrification in the service of the rich and
powerful.1"4 Interpreting the public use requirement too
expansively exacerbates the potential for political abuses of
government takings powers. As Justice O'Connor warned in her
dissenting opinion in Kelo:
[T]he fallout from this decision will not be random. The
beneficiaries
are
likely
to be
those
citizens
with
disproportionate influence and power in the political process,
including large corporations and development firms. As for the
victims, the government now has license to transfer property
from those with fewer resources to those with more.1 47

It is important to emphasize that there are potential political
abuses of eminent domain in all economic development takings
and not just in cases, such as Kelo, where the properties are well
maintained and not blighted as in Berman. In fact, the potential
political abuses are probably much greater in cases like Berman
because the residents who will be most adversely affected by the
takings will not have the political influence to resist them.1 48 In
this regard, it is relevant to observe that, even though the
Supreme Court upheld the takings (with just compensation) in
Kelo, where the takings occurred in a relatively affluent and
certainly unblighted neighborhood, the City of New London's

144.

Amy Lavine, Urban Renewal and the Stoy of Berman v. Parker, 42 URB. LAW. 423,

424 (2010).
145. See id. at 472-73 (observing that the deferential standard used to uphold the
taking in Berman led to Congress enacting broad reforms and the courts permitting
broader takings challenges in an attempt to undo the consequences of urban renewal

projects).
146. See, e.g., SOMIN, supranote 77, 15-17 (observing that Pfizer Inc. not only strongly
influenced the City of New London's economic redevelopment plan but that it also
lobbied the city's redevelopment agency extensively to encourage it to exercise its takings
powers); see also Smythe, supra note 40, at 28 (observing that allowing takings for
economic development plans "opens the door to an abuse of the State's powers by those
who are the most wealthy and influential against those who are the least wealthy and

influential").
147. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
148.

Smythe, supra note 14, at 408.
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economic development plan was, in the end, stymied by political
opposition. 149 In contrast, in Berman, where the takings occurred
in a poor, blighted neighborhood in Washington, D.C., the
economic development plan was implemented, and over five
thousand mostly poor African-American residents in the
neighborhood were displaced. 15 Sadly, Justice O'Connor's dire
warning in Kelo had already proved true.
The takings in Kelo were a terrible mistake and an injustice to
the owners of the properties that were targeted. If any good can
result from such a fiasco, it will be from the scrutiny that it
placed on economic development takings and the public use
requirement generally. It is unfortunate that the lesson had not
already been learned from Berman. The sad consequences of the
takings in Kelo and Berman have made it clear that overly
expansive conceptions of the public use requirement invite
political abuses of the government's takings powers. The public
use requirement should be construed narrowly to prevent
further abuses of the democratic process by constraining
government powers that can be so easily abused.
One of the overarching principles of constitutional democracy
is the idea that certain government powers should be
constrained to protect citizens' rights and liberties from political
abuses.1 5 1 Given the obvious political abuses of the government's
power of eminent domain, the Supreme Court should overrule
Kelo and Berman and define public uses much more narrowly. To
respect the historical interpretation of the term, public uses

149. There were several plaintiffs in Kelo, and there was considerable media coverage
of the case. Local politicians faced so much criticism that the mayor of New London
issued an apology to the displaced property owners in 2012. SOMIN, supra note 77, at 235.
Somin observed that ten years after the case, the condemned properties remained
undeveloped and unused. Id.
150. Smythe, supra note 14, at 408. Amy Lavine has recounted the long-neglected
story behind Berman. See generally Lavine, supra note 144. Berman was largely neglected by
the media and, in Lavine's view, "will likely remain esoteric to much of the public" for
years to come. Id. at 474.
151. As James Madison wrote:
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of
oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the
Community, and the invasion of private rights is cheifly [sic] to be
apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its
constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of
the major number of the constituents.
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), NAT'L ARCHIVES:
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-11-02-0218

[https://perma.cc/3VYU-CTLU] (last updated Jan. 5, 2021).
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should include the transfer of private property to (1) public
ownership, (2) public carriers or utilities, or (3) private owners
for uses that will be open to the public. The Court should be
wary of including anything beyond that. The Court would have
to overrule some precedents, such as Berman and Kelo, but a
narrow interpretation of the public use requirement such as this
would be consistent with most of the Supreme Court's takings
jurisprudence, and it would help to prevent the kind of political
abuses of government power against which the courts in a
constitutional democracy have always been the last safeguard.
The Supreme Court should also apply its public use
requirement consistently across all takings, whether they are
conventional ones where permanent physical possession of land
is taken, regulatory takings, or takings by exactions. Under the
Penn Central multi-factor test for regulatory takings, there is some
weight given to the character of the government action; that
could allow some consideration for whether the action is for a
public use. However, that consideration is only given in
determining whether the government's action was a taking and
thus whether just compensation is required. It does not constrain
the government from engaging in any regulatory takings; it
merely influences the likelihood that just compensation will be
required. This still leaves open the possibility that the
government's regulatory powers will be subject to political
abuses. The public use requirement needs to be applied
separately from whatever multi-factor test the Court uses to
determine whether a regulation amounts to a taking. The
potential for political abuses in the regulatory process implies
the same need for a public use test in exactions takings cases.
And because the nexus and rough-proportionality tests are used
merely to determine whether exactions amount to takings and
just compensation is required, the public use requirement
should be applied independently of them.
There is some urgency to the matter because the courts have
not yet applied a public use requirement at all in regulatory
takings cases or exactions takings cases; thus, the scope of such
potential abuses through regulatory takings and exactions
takings is even greater than it is through conventional takings.
Applying the public use requirement to all takings cases would
make takings jurisprudence more coherent, and it would provide
safeguards against political abuses of government powers and
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regulatory processes. In fact, the public use requirement would
allow the courts to constrain some government and regulatory
excesses in ways that they can no longer do through the doctrine
of substantive due process.
The idea of using takings jurisprudence to accomplish what
substantive due process can no longer do might seem like a
sleight of hand. But that would misconstrue the Constitution.
Some critics of the substantive due process doctrine argue that it
has no textual basis in the Constitution. The Takings Clause
clearly does have a textual basis in the Constitution, and its
obvious purpose is to constrain governments from abusing
private property rights. The just compensation requirement
ensures that politically motivated expropriations at least come at
some costs. But many regulatory takings might be worth the costs
to the political interests that lobby for them, especially since the
costs might be borne in part by others. And the just
compensation paid to those whose property rights are taken
might seem less just to them than it does to the political interests
that motivate the takings. Applying a meaningful public use filter
to regulations and exactions would provide a stronger check
against the political abuses of governments' legislative powers
and their regulatory processes.
It would also relieve the burden of government regulatory
powers on private property generally. To the extent that
government powers create the potential for takings, regulations,
and exactions, they also burden all private property rights with a
contingency that exists merely because of the possibility that the
government might exercise its powers. 152 Constraining the
government's takings powers by defining the public use
requirement narrowly and applying it to all takings, including
the
reduce
would
takings,
exactions
and
regulatory
contingencies government powers place on private property,
reduce the risks to investors in developing properties, diminish
the uncertainty associated with the ownership of private
property, and increase the market value of private property. In
other words, it would reverse the adverse consequences of
construing government powers too expansively.
Of course, it would be a mistake to hamstring the government
and lose the social benefits of constructive and salutary

152. See supra Part II.
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regulations. To ensure that government retains adequate
regulatory powers, therefore, it is essential for courts to apply the
nuisance rule appropriately. Properly interpreted, a nuisance
regulation does not take private property rights; it merely aligns
them appropriately in relation to the rights of others. It is true
that the nuisance rule creates the potential for political abuses
because politically powerful parties might try to alter the
alignment of private rights in their own interests, but as long as
there is a legal standard that courts can apply to distinguish
nuisance regulations from others, they can rebuff those efforts,
and the abuses can be minimized. Courts will, no doubt, make
mistakes in the application of the laws, but there would be an
even greater danger to liberty and justice if they applied the
wrong laws.
V. CONCLUSION

In the years to come, the future of the country will turn on the
direction of the Supreme Court, and the direction of the
Supreme Court will turn on the outcomes of national elections.
Regrettable though it may be, the direction of takings
jurisprudence may turn on politics. It is discomfiting to have to
rely on the political process to check political abuses of
government powers. Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court is
the last line of defense for liberty and justice against the
encroachments of influential political interests. However the
political process shapes the direction of the Supreme Court, one
can only hope that the Justices will have the reason, character,
and judgement to turn takings law in a more constructive
direction, make it more coherent and less dysfunctional,
empower governments to resolve legitimate nuisance problems,
and also provide more meaningful protections for private
property.

